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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The jurisdiction of this case is vested with the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 78-2a-3(2)(h), and pursuant to Rules 3(a) and 4(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
CONTRACTS 
1. Whether the trial court erred in it's interpretation of various "California Residential Purchase 
Agreements" and if s conclusion of law as stated within the court's "Findings of Fact" #13. 
Determinative Law: "Contracts, made either before or after marriage, the purpose of which 
is to fix property rights between a husband and wife, are to be liberally interpreted to carry out the 
intentions of the makers and to uphold such contracts where they are fairly and understandably made, 
are just and equitable in their provisions, and are not obtained by fraud or overreaching ." 
Matlock v.Matlock. 223 Kan 679,576 P.2d 629,633 (1978) 
Standard of Review; Interpretation of a contract presents a question of law for which the trial 
court's determination is reviewed under a correction of error standard, according no particular 
deference to the trial court's decision. 
DISTRIBUTION OF RETIREMENT BENEFITS 
4. Whether the trial court erred in the distribution of Respondent/Appeallee's "Woodward" 
share of Petitioner/Appealant's retirement benefits. 
Determinative Law: "It is preferable to end the marriage and allow the parties to make as 
much of a clean break from each other as is reasonably possible." Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 
1076 at 1079 (Utah App.1988) "Pursuant to Woodward, the preferred method for doing so is to fix the 
other spouse's share of the pension plan, as adjusted for all the appropriate considerations, and 
satisfy the other spouse's share out of other assets, thereby leaving all pension benefits to the 
employee." See Woodward 656 P.2d 431 at 433 (Utah App. 1982). "This is especially true when 
there are sufficient other assets for equitable distribution and a present value of the retirement benefits 
can be established." See Cambers v. Chambers, 840 p.2d 841 at 845 (Utah App. 1992) citing 
Motes v Motes. 786 P.2d 232 at 234 (Utah App 1989). 
Standard of Review: The trial court's determination is reviewed under a correction of error 
standard, according no particular deference to the trial court. 
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STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is an appeal from the final judgement and "Order Modifying Decree of Divorce" of the 
Second Judicial District Court for Davis County, State of Utah, Honorable Thomas L. Kay, presiding, 
filed March 21,2007 following a hearing on July 3,2006 during which the court considered the 
following matters: 
CONTRACTS 
1.) whether Mrs, Bayles, Respondent/Appellee, should be held in contempt for breach of contract, 
and compelled to give specific performance in connection with two (2) "California Vacant Land 
Purchase Agreements" and a "California Residential Purchase Agreement" entered into by Mrs. 
Bayles, under which Mr. Bayles, Petitioner/Appellent, exercised a right of first refusal granted him 
by the court in the interlocatory "Decree of Devorce". Such issues were certified for trial by an 
"Order on Order to Show Cause" filed April 7,2005 (Record on Appeal page 400) 
DISTRIBUTION OF RETIREMENT BENEFITS 
2.) a "Verified Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce" filed June 2,2004 (Record on Appeal page 244) 
as provided by the interlocutory "Decree of Divorce" (Record on Appeal page 167) the amount of a 
Survivor Benefit awarded to Respondent/Appellee, and which party should pay the monthly cost, 
which issues the Court reserved for future determination, subject to a provision that 
Petitioner/Appellent should not elect a reduced survivor benefit prior to the Court's determination as to 
the amount and who should pay the monthly cost, (see "Decree of Divorce", paragraphs #24, #26 
and #27.) 
Petitioner/Appellant objects to the provisions of the Courts "Order Modifying the Decree of 
Divorce" concerning (among other matters): 1) the trial court's interpretation of the various 
California Purchase Agreements; and 2) The manner of distributing RespondentAppeallee's 
share of Petitioner/Apellant's retirement benefits; 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Mr. Bayles, the Petitioner/Appellant was granted an interlocutory "Decree of Divorce" from 
Mrs. Bayles, Respondent/Appellee by the Second Judicial District Court, Davis County, State of Utah 
filed November 25,2002, effective October 2,2002. (See Decree of Divorce, page 1., paragraph 2.) 
CONTRACTS 
2. At the time of the divorce the parties held eight (8) parcels of real property in the State of 
California as follows; (Decree of Divorce, page 3M paragraph 12.) 
1.) three (3) parcels together with a double-wide mobile 
home; 
2.) a personal residence; 
3.) two (2) parcels together known as the "Beehive Mine" 
property; 
4.) a 23-acre parcel known as the "lake" property; and 
5.) a 5-acre parcel. 
3. The "Decree of Divorce" ordered that all the California real properties be sold and the net 
proceeds be split 50/50 between Appellant and Appellee. The decree further awarded a Right of First 
Refusal to Petitioner/Appellant to aquire Responent/Appellee's interest in the property upon her 
acceptance of a bona-fide offer. The "Right" was to be based on the same terms as the bona-fide 
offer and was to be executed within 30 days of being notified by RespondentAppellee of her 
acceptance of an offer. Petitioner/Appellant was ordered to pay Respondent/Appellee the amount 
she would receive from the sale of the parcel based on the same terms of the bona-fide offer and 
was to make payment within 30 days of Petitioner/Appellant's exercise of his right of first refusal. 
(Decree of Divorce, page 4., paragraph 15 & 17) 
4. On May 13,2003 shortly after the divorce the three (3) parcels with the mobile home were 
sold to a third party through escrow. Respondent/Appellee received $44,419.80 at the escrow 
closing of that sale. (Transcript of Trial, page 73, lines 10-13) 
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5. During May of 2003 Appellant exercised his Right of First Refusal under a Uniform Real 
Estate Sales Contract to purchase Appellee's interest in the California personal residence. On or 
about June 4,2003 Appellant paid the sum of $39,286.74 for that interest. Appellee accepted the 
payment, gave a quit-claim deed, and demanded an additional amount of $4,350 which the trial court 
awarded her. (Transcript of Trial, page 75, lines 1 - 6) Appellee refused to comply with any of the 
terms of the Uniform Real Estate Sales Contract. In it's Order Modifying Decree of Divorce entered 
March 21,2007 the trial court found that Appellee was in breach of the contract but denied an order 
for specific performance finding she is not required to comply with any of the terms of the sales 
agreement, which is one of the issues of this appeal. 
6. During November, 2004 Appellant exercised his Right of First Refusal under a Uniform 
Real Estate Sales Contract to purchase Appellee's interest in California real property (consisting of 
two (2) parcels) known as the "Beehive Mine" property. On or about Dec 6,2004 Appellant paid the 
sum of $25,596.22 for that interest. Payment was sent along with a letter in which Petitioner/Appellant 
demanded Respondent/Appellee comply with the terms of the bona-fide contract. (Transcript of Trial, 
page 75, lines 13-25) She accepted the payment, but refused to open escrow or comply with any 
of the terms of the Uniform Real Estate Sales Contract, In it's Order Modifying Decree of Divorce the 
trial court found Appellee was in breach of the contract but denied an order for specific performance 
finding she is not required to comply with any of the terms of the sales agreement, which is one of the 
issues of this appeal. 
7. During February, 2005 Appellant exercised his Right of First Refusal under a Uniform 
Real Estate Sales Contract to purchase Appellee's interest in the California real property known as the 
"Lake" property. On or about Mar 5,2005 Appellant paid the sum of $38,866.71 for that interest. 
Payment was sent along with a letter in which Petitioner/Appellant demanded Respondent/Appellee 
comply with the terms of the bona-fide contract. (Transcript of Trial, page 76, lines 7-16) She 
accepted the payment, but refused to open escrow, deliver a deed, or comply with any of the terms 
of the Uniform Real Estate Sales Contract. In it's Order Modifying Decree of Divorce the trial court 
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found Appellee was in breach of the contract but denied an order for specific performance finding she 
is not required to comply with any of the terms of the sales agreement, which is one of the issues of 
this appeal. 
DISTRIBUTION OF RETIREMENT BENEFITS 
8. The interlocutory "Decree of Divorce" awarded Respondent/Appellee a "Woodward" share 
of Petitioner/Appellant's retirement benefits and a 100% survivor benefit pending Petitioner/Appellant's 
retirement. The decree specifically provided that his retirement would be sufficient grounds for a 
petition for modification to determine the proper amount of survivor benefit and who should be required 
to pay the cost of that benefit. (Decree of Divorce, page 6., paragraph 24.) 
9. The interlocutory decree reserved for future determination the issue of the proper amount 
of survivor benefits to be awarded and the issue of which party should pay the monthly cost to be 
determined at the time of Petitioner/Appellant's retirement. However, in order to avoid forfeiture of the 
ability to elect a full survivor benefit, the court ordered Appellant to not elect a reduced survivor benefit. 
(Decree of Divorce, page 7., paragraph 26 & 27.) 
10. Petitioner/Appellant retired on disability effective November 31,2002. (Transcript of Trial, 
page 26, lines 17-21) Upon retirement he elected a 100% survivor benefit pursuant to the trial court's 
order within the Decree of Divorce, pending determination of the court as to the appropriate amount of 
the survivor benefit and who should pay the cost of that benefit. 
11. A hearing was held regarding the "Petition to Modify" on July 3,2006. The trial court 
rendered it's decision on the Petition on July 5,2006. The "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" 
and the "Order Modifying Decree of Divorce" were final upon their filing on March 21,2007. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. CONTRACTS: The trial court incorrectly interpreted the plain language of each of the 
California Purchase Agreements. The trial court committed legal error by incorrectly selecting only 
one element or provision of each of three (3) California Purchase Agreements (ie: the consideration 
to be paid) in it's application of established or normal rules of contract construction or interpretation. 
By selecting only one element of each of the contracts, the court effectively created unenforceable 
unilateral contracts. Thus, Plaintiff/Appellant's payment for each of the properties should be returned 
and the properties placed back on the market to obtain truely bona-fide enforceable purchase offers. 
However, the transactions between the parties as to each parcel of property, meet the longstanding 
"offer, acceptance and tender" requirements of any contract transaction. Mrs. Bayles received the 
benefit of tender, to the detriment of Mr. Bayles and the court's equitable powers do not allow the trial 
court to modify a transaction simply because one of the parties has come to regret the agreement. 
Mr. Bayles is entitled to specific performance as to each contract for his purchase of Mrs. Bayles's 
interest in each of the contracts. 
2. DISTRIBUTION OF RETIREMENT BENEFITS: The trial court committed legal error by not 
applying the plain language of various Utah Appeallate Court Cases which establish fixed principles 
for distribution of vested retirement benefits. Especially where the present value of an annuity can 
easily be determined and where there are sufficient assets to provide a lump sum "cash-out" of the 
Respondent/Appellee's marital interest in the annuity. While the court properly applied the 
"Woodward" formula for determining the proper portion of the spousal interest, it clearly failed to 
apply the proper manner of distribution of that interest as established in the "Woodward" case as well 
as other cases. 
- 7 -
ARGUMENT 
CONTRACTS 
1. Mr. Bayles, the Petitioner/Appellant, is entitled to specific performance relative to the 
purchase of Mrs. Bayles's one-half interest in each of the California properties. 
2. The Utah Supreme Court has long recognized the validity If the rule that "to be 
enforceable a contract must be sufficiently definite in it's terms that the parties know what is 
required of them" Pitcher v. Lauritzen, 423 P.2d 491 (Utah App. 1967); and Kier v. Condrack, 
478 P.2d 327 (Utah App. 1970). 
3. Under the evidence and the particular facts of this case there is no dispute that Mr Bayles 
agreed to purchase Mrs. Bayles's interest in each of the subject properties. Mrs. Bayles agreed to 
open an escrow and provide other products and services in consideration of payment by Mr. Bayles 
of the agreed upon tender. 
4. Mrs. Bayles negotiated the terms of each of the three contracts in this case with third 
parties, without the involvement of Mr. Bayles in any way. When all terms had been accepted by Mrs. 
Bayles, she then presented them to Mr. Bayles who had the opportunity to either accept them, reject 
them, modify them, or exercise his right of first refusal to purchase Mrs. Bayles's interest by paying 
her what she would receive if they were sold to the third parties. (Paragraph #15 of the Decree of 
Divorce is ambiguous as to whether "what she would" receive means gross or net. Paragraph #17 
appears to imply it means net.) 
5. Kier is also applicable as to specific performance. There is no dispute in this case that Mr. 
Bayles properly and timely exercised his right of first refusal on each property and there is no dispute 
that Mr. Bayles timely tendered full payment of the gross purchase price within thirty (30) days as 
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required by paragraph #15 of the Decree of Divorce. Nor is there any dispute that Mrs. Bayles 
accepted and negotiated the payments and then refused to perform any of the agreed upon terms of 
the contracts. Again, the Utah Supreme Court found that if the parties 
... should be obliged to act in good faith in keeping their 
promises. It would seem inequitable and unjust to permit a 
seller to simply refuse unreasoningly to perform and seek 
specious excuses in an attempt to justify his refusal. ... But 
neither party should be permited to use the reservation of 
"terms" to get more than they had promised: the plaintiff to 
get more land, or the defendants to get more money, nor 
either to renege on the bargain... (emphasis added) 
6. Mrs. Bayles's acceptance was "positive and unambiguous" as required by the Utah 
Supreme Court in RJ. Daum Constr. Co. v. Child, 122 Utah 194 (Utah 1952). Mrs. Bayles's actions in 
negotiating the payment and refusal to return payment did not change, add to, or qualify the terms of 
the contracts between the parties for the "sale" of Mrs. Bayles's interest in the California properties 
and "it's binding force cannot be affected by subsequent communications unless they amount to a 
mutual agreement to rescind." Id. 
7. In the instant case Mrs. Bayles's terms were all set forth in the Real Estate Contracts she 
sent to Mr. Bayles. Mr. Bayles accepted those terms and tendered his "full payment" and demanded 
she perform her agreed upon terms. She has the use and benefit of the monies paid to the detriment 
of Mr. Bayles. Mrs. Bayles cannot hold hostage the agreed upon deeds and other products and 
services she agreed to provide. Mr. Bayles is entitled to specific performance as to the terms of the 
contracts or the return of his tender. 
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DISTRIBUTION OF RETIREMENT BENEFITS 
8. It is well established that a person's interest in a retirement plan accrued during a marriage 
is considered a marital asset subject to equitable distribution upon divorce. See, e.g., Woodward v. 
Woodward, 656 P.2d 431,432 (Utah 1982). 
9. The best method for distributing or allocating retirement benefits or their value depends on 
the particular circumstances. But where possible, the purpose to advance, is that of ending marriage 
and allowing the parties to make as much of a clean break from each other as is reasonably possible. 
Thus, as between decreeing a more immediate adjustment or simply deferring the other spouse's 
participation until payments are eventually received, our Supreme Court has stated that the latter 
alternative should be employed only in rare instances. See Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076,1079. 
10. The Utah Appeals Court in Chambers v. Chambers, 840 P.2d 841 (Utah App. 1992) 
discussed the manner of distributing retirement benefits: 
Pursuant to "Woodward", the preferred method for doing so is 
to fix the other spouse's share of the pension plan, as 
adjusted for all the appropriate considerations, and satisfy the 
other spouse's share out of other assets, thereby leaving all 
pension benefits to the employee. See Woodward, 656 
p.2d 431 at 433. This is especially true when there are 
sufficient other assets for equitable distribution and a present 
value of the retirement benefits can be established, id-
However, in the case at bar, it would appear that the trial 
court did not even consider such possibility here. 
Accordingly, the trial court's order with regard to Mr. 
Chambers's retirement benefit is reversed and remanded 
with directions to reconsider it's division of Mr. 
Chambers's retirement benefits under the analysis set forth 
in "Woodward", including particularly the preference for 
valuation of the non-employee spouse's share and it's 
immediate cash-out from other assets, (emphasis added) 
Chambers v. Chambers. 840 P.2d 841 (Utah App. 1992). 
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11. Obviously, postponing a distribution until monthly payments are received and incurring 
possible ongoing entanglement between the parties until one of them dies, is inimical to the goal of 
ending the marriage, making as much of a clean break as possible. 
12. In a similar case the Utah Court of Appeals in Motes v. Motes, 786 P,2d 232 at 234 - 235 
(Utah App. 1989) said: 
"The instant case does not involve the difficult questions 
presented by retirement programs held by those still working, 
which will—or may-only eventually result in income. In the 
instant case, like in Greene, one spouse had already retired 
and his retirement benefits had ripened into monthly 
payments, see 751 P.2d 827 at 828, the present value of 
plaintiffs share of the now-fixed stream of income, which the 
benefits have become, can be readily calculated and 
compensated for with distribution of other assets having an 
equivalent value, or cashed out over a comparatively short 
time.M "Accordingly, we reverse the court's treatment 
of both parties1 retirement funds and remand for 
distribution in accordance with the foregoing." See 
Greene v Greene, 751 P.2d 827 (emphasis added) 
As with "Greene", this instant case does not have the difficult issues of benefits not yet realized. 
In the instant case Mr. Bayles has retired and the present value of his annuity is readily determinable. 
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CONCLUSION 
CONTRACTS 
1. The trial court incorrectly interpreted the plain language of each of the three (3) California 
Purchase Agreements. The trial court committed legal error by incorrectly selecting only one element 
or provision of each of the three (3) California Purchase Agreements (ie; the consideration to be paid) 
in it's application of established or normal rules of contract construction or interpretation. By selecting 
only one element of each of the contracts, the trial court effectively created unenforceable unilateral 
contracts. Thus, Plaintiff/Appellant's payment for each of the properties should be returned and the 
properties placed back on the market to obtain truely bona-fide enforceable purchase offers. 
2. It was judicial error for the trial court to refuse to order specific performance or return the 
monies Petitioner/Appellant paid to Respondent/Appellee. The ruling of the trial court should be 
reversed and Respondent/Appellee should be ordered to either return all monies she was paid under 
the three (3) California Purchase Agreements, or provide all the services and products called for within 
the four corners of the contract. 
DISTRIBUTION OF RETIREMENT BENEFITS 
3. The trial court incorrectly interpreted the plain language of a body of Utah Appellate case 
law which establish fixed principles for distribution of vested retirement benefits. Especially where the 
present value of the retirement annuity can easily be determined and where there are sufficient assets 
to provide a lump sum "cash-out" of the Respondent/Appeallee's marital interest in the annuity. Thus 
the trial court erred in the distribution of Respondent/Appellee's "Woodward" share of 
Petitioner/Appellant's retirement benefits. While the court properly applied the "Woodward" formula 
for determining the proper portion of the spousal interest, it clearly failed to apply the proper manner 
of distribution of that interest as established in the "Woodward" case as well as other cases. 
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4. Accordingly, the trial court's order with regard to Mr. Bayles's retirement benefit should be 
reversed and remanded with directions to reconsider it's manner of distributing Mr. Bayles's 
retirement benefits under the analysis set forth in "Woodward" and the preference for valuation of the 
spouse's share and it's immediate cash-out from other assets. 
5. Based on the foregoing, Mr. Bayles respectfully requests that the court reverse and 
remand with directions to reconsider it's division of Mr. Bayles's retirement benefits under the 
analysis set forth in "Woodward" and the preference for valuation of the spouse's share and it's 
immediate cash-out from other assets consistent with this court's decision. 
DATED this _Z day of September, 2007 
Wesley 0 , Bayles,
 / -
prose 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Wesley 0. Bayles, certify that on the H ' day of September, 2007,1 served 
a copy of the attached Brief of the Petitioner/Appellant upon Judy Dawn Barking, the 
counsel for Respondent/Appellee in this matter, by mailing to her by first class mall, 
postage prepaid to the following address: 
Judy Dawn Barking 
Attorney at Law 
427 27th Street 
Ogden, UT 84401 
WESLEY 0. BAYLES, Pro Se 
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ADDENDUM 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Decree of Divorce 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Order Modifying Decree of Divorce 
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E. NORDELL WEEKS (3412) 
ERIC N. WEEKS (7340) 
WEEKS LAW FIRM 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
1050 Walker Terrace 
19 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 322-2800 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WESLEY 0. BAYLES, 
I FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Petitioner , CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. 
Civil No. 004702059 DA 
LINDA CARYL BAYLES, 
Judge Thomas L. Kay 
Respondent . 
The above-entitled matter was heard before the Honorable 
Thomas L. Kay, Judge of the above-entitled court, pursuant to a 
trial on this matter held on October 1 through October 2, 2002. 
The Court, having reviewed the documents and pleadings on file 
herein, having heard testimony and reviewed documentation and 
being fully advised as to both the evidence and law pertaining 
thereto, hereby makes its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The petitioner is a resident of Davis County, State of 
Utah, and has been for at least three (3) months immediately prior 
to the filing of this action. 
INDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
FILED 
NOV 2 5 2002 
Layton District Court 
VD10820261 
2. The parties resided in the marital relationship in the 
State of Utah or the acts complained of by the petitioner were 
committed by the respondent in the State of Utah and therefore the 
above-captioned Court has jurisdiction over the respondent 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-27-24(6) (1953 as amended). 
3 . The petitioner and respondent were married in the City 
of Bountiful, State of Utah, on the 10th day of August, 1988, and 
separated on or about November 28, 2000. 
Grounds for Divorce 
4. During the course of this marriage, differences have 
arisen between the parties, which differences have now become 
irreconcilable, thereby making continuation of the marriage 
relationship impossible. 
5. The petitioner should be granted a Decree of Divorce 
from the respondent on the grounds of irreconcilable differences 
effective October 2, 2002. 
Children of the Parties 
6. No Children have been born as issue of this marriage 
and none are expected. 
7 . The respondent currently has physical custody of two 
minor children, the petitioner's grand nephew Andrew Vincent 
Salazar and Andrew's sister BreAnna Rosa Flores Salazar, who are 
not the issue of this marriage. Custody is held pursuant to 
Salazar v. Salazat, case number 954904926 DA, filed in the Third 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
8. The Court finds that the issue of child support was 
not certified for trial and, even if it had been, there is no Utah 
statute or case law that extends an obligation for petitioner to 
pay child support in this circumstance. 
Health Insurance 
9. Each party should maintain their own health, accident, 
hospitalization and dental insurance. The petitioner should 
provide any necessary cooperation in respondent's obtaining for 
her benefit continued health, accident, hospitalization and dental 
insurance coverage under the federal C.O.B.R.A. legislation, at 
the sole cost of the respondent. 
10. On February 14, 2002, the Commissioner ordered the 
petitioner to pay the respondent $1,100 per month commencing March 
1, 2002. The Commissioner allowed the petitioner to deduct from 
said payments the amount of $87.50 per month representing the 
respondent's share of monthly health insurance premiums paid by 
petitioner. He also ordered (in a separate paragraph) each party 
to be responsible for their own debts from the date of separation. 
11. On August 30, 2002, the Commissioner ruled that his 
Order was to be applied prospectively and not retroactively. He 
found the petitioner wrongfully withheld $1,312.50 representing 
one-half of the cost of health insurance premiums previously paid 
by petitioner for 15 months from the date of separation to the 
date of his Order (December 1, 2000, to February 14, 2002) and 
ordered the petitioner to reimburse the amount of $1,312.50 to the 
respondent. 
12. The petitioner has failed to reimburse to the 
respondent $1,312.50, representing petitioner's withholding of 1/2 
3 
of the cost of health insurance premiums paid from December 1, 
2000, through February 14, 2002 ($87.50 x 15 months = $1,312.50). 
Debts and Obligations 
13. The parties have incurred certain debts and 
obligations. The parties are unable to afford the lifestyle they 
have been maintaining and have incurred extensive credit card 
debt. 
14. The respondent should be required to pay and hold 
petitioner harmless on the debts owing on the Providian Card, the 
Citibank card, the Chase/Walmart Card, and the MBNA card. 
15. The petitioner should be required to pay and hold 
the respondent harmless on the debts owing on the America First 
Credit Union Visa card, the line of credit at America First Credit 
Union, and the Firestone account. 
16. Since the separation of the parties, the petitioner 
has paid approximately $61,000 toward the marital debt obligations 
that existed at the time of separation. The petitioner shall not 
receive any credit or offset in the marital settlement for such 
payments. This Court finds that the majority of the debt was 
incurred by the petitioner and that petitioner had the financial 
ability to pay the debt and the respondent did not. 
Real Property 
17. The petitioner and the respondent have acquired a 
residence located1at 1422 Vineyard Drive, Bountiful, Utah (the 
"Bountiful Residence"). The Bountiful Residence should be awarded 
to the petitioner subject to the debt thereon. The respondent 
should cooperate in executing a quitclaim deed in favor of the 
petitioner or other documents necessary to relinquish her interest 
in the Bountiful Residence. 
18. The petitioner should be permitted to sell the 
Bountiful Residence, with the respondent having no further claim 
or interest therein. The petitioner should be permitted to retain 
any profit or be responsible for any loss associated with any sale 
thereof. Respondent shall cooperate in executing any documents 
and taking any steps necessary to allow the petitioner to proceed 
with the sale and transfer of the Residence. 
19. The respondent should not be responsible for 
payment of the first and second mortgage on the Bountiful 
Residence for the period she resided in the Residence from the 
date of separation through the time she moved to Oklahoma in 
August 2001. 
20. The parties have acquired additional interests in 
certain other real property, including but not limited to 
(a) Parcel 1 of land and associated improvements located at 10692 
Forbestown Road, Yuba County, California; (b) Parcel 13 of land 
and associated improvements located at 10747 Forbestown Road, Yuba 
County, California; (c) Parcel 15 of land and associated 
improvements located at 10695 Forbestown Road, Yuba County, 
California; (d) Parcel 16 of land and associated improvements 
located at 10691 Forbestown Road, Yuba County, California; and 
(e) Parcels 8 and 10 of land located in Yuba County, California, 
also known as the Beehive Mine. 
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21. Parcels 1, 13, 15, and 16 are found to be jointly 
held by the parties and should be considered joint marital 
property. 
22. The Court finds that there is not clear and 
convincing evidence of duress associated with plaintiff's transfer 
of parcels 8 and 10 to the respondent as a joint tenant. Parcels 
8 and 10 should be considered joint marital property. 
23. The real property and improvements known as Parcel 
2 (also known as parcels 22 and 23) located at approximately 10681 
Forbestown Road, Yuba County, California shall be considered joint 
marital property. There is not sufficient evidence to 
conclusively track the funds used to purchase the property and to 
establish the lack of commingling that would be required to 
establish Parcel 2 (also referred to as Parcels 22 and 23) as the 
separate property of the petitioner. 
24. In light of the parties' past payment and debt 
history, the above-mentioned California properties should be sold 
as soon as possible. 
25. The petitioner shall hereinafter be entitled to 
retain the rental income from Parcels 1 and 15 and shall be 
obligated to maintain the monthly payments on the mortgages for 
said parcels through the date of sale of said properties. 
26. The petitioner should be awarded a right of first 
refusal for the purchase of any and all of the California 
properties. Upon acceptance of any bona fide offer to purchase a 
California property, the petitioner shall receive written notice 
of the acceptance of the offer and shall have thirty (30) days 
from the receipt of said notice to provide written notice of his 
election to purchase the property on the same terms as the bona 
fid|| offer. If petitioner exercises the right of first refusal, 
he shall pay the respondent the amount she would receive from the 
sale of that parcel, said payment to be made within 3 0 days of the 
time he exercises his right of first refusal. 
27. The respondent is awarded a secondary right of 
first refusal. In the event that the petitioner fails to exercise 
his right of first refusal within thirty (30) days following his 
receipt of notice of acceptance of a bona fide offer, the 
respondent shall thereafter have thirty (30) days to provide 
written notice of her election to purchase the property on the 
same terms as the bona fide offer. If respondent exercises her 
right of first refusal, she shall pay the petitioner the amount he 
would receive from the sale of that parcel, said payment to be 
made within 30 days of the time she exercises her right of first 
refusal. 
28. At the time of closing on the sale of each 
California property, proceeds from the sale shall first be applied 
to pay any and all closing costs, real estate commissions or fees, 
and any existing mortgage obligations owing, including any tax 
and/or debt delinquencies owed in relation to the property. .After 
such costs have been paid, the petitioner shall be entitled to 
receive one-half 6f the total amount of payments he has made 
toward delinquent and current taxes on the property and, as 
applicable, one-half of the total amount he has paid toward the 
mortgage obligations in the property commencing with the month of 
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October 2002 through the date of sale. Any and all remaining 
proceeds from the sale of the property shall be split equally 
between the parties. 
29. The Court finds that the real property and 
improvements located at (a) 1441 Michigan Avenue, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, and (b) Blanding, Utah, are the separate, inherited property 
of the petitioner. 
30. The petitioner has made no claim in these 
proceedings as to any ownership interest in the home in which 
respondent is residing in the State of Oklahoma nor to the 
respondent's mother's home in Oklahoma. 
Personal Property 
31. The parties have acquired certain joint marital 
personal property, including household furniture, motor vehicles, 
and certain personal property and possessions. 
32. The respondent should be awarded those, personal 
heirlooms located at the California properties, namely plates, 
platters, clocks, and lamps. The court finds that the ski pole in 
the possession of the petitioner is a family heirloom of the 
respondent and respondent shall be awarded the ski pole. 
Petitioner shall be permitted to make a model of the ski pole and 
shall deliver possession of the ski pole to the respondent within 
90 days of entry of this Order at her place of residence and at 
the expense of th6 petitioner. 
33. The remainder of the personal property should be 
awarded to the parties as currently divided. 
34. The petitioner has received approximately $15,000 
more in value of personal property than has the respondent. 
35. The Court finds that the petitioner has paid 
$15,000 to the respondent, which shall be considered an offset for 
the additional value of personal property received by the 
petitioner. 
Alimony 
36. The petitioner has made monthly payments to the 
respondent from the date of separation, including the total amount 
of $8,337 in monthly payments during the period from February 14, 
2002, through the month of October 2002. These payments shall be 
considered temporary alimony. 
37. The respondent has the ability to earn $8 per hour 
and to work 40 hours per week. The petitioner is not working like 
he used to work, but historically has had a greater ability to pay 
expenses than the respondent has ability to earn money. 
38. Commencing with the month of November 2002, the 
petitioner should hereinafter be obligated to pay alimony to the 
respondent in the monthly amount of $1,000, payable one-half on 
the 5th of the month and one-half on the 20th of each month, to 
continue until alimony is reviewed at the time of petitioner's 
retirement. Alimony shall terminate as determined by the Court or 
upon the marriage or cohabitation of the respondent, the death of 
either party, or lipon the occurrence of any event, which, under 
Utah law, shall cause alimony to cease. 
39. The alimony award shall be reviewed at the time of 
petitioner's retirement. Based upon the current circumstances of 
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the parties, petitioner's retirement shall be considered to be a 
sufficient basis to perfnit a review of alimony. At the time of 
review, the Court shall make determinations as to whether the 
monthly alimony payments will be modified or discontinued. Such 
review shall be made in conjunction with review of the issues 
related to payment of retirement and survivor benefits set forth 
in the following section. 
Pensions and Retirement Benefits 
40. The petitioner has acquired pension and retirement 
funds prior to and during the term of the marriage of the parties. 
The respondent should be entitled to receive one-half (1/2) of the 
petitioner's pension and retirement funds which were accrued 
during the term of the marriage pursuant to the Woodward formula 
and a Qualified Domestic Relations Order shall issue in 
association therewith. 
41. The petitioner's retirement plan includes an option 
to elect either full or partial survivor benefits. The Court 
finds that election of a survivor benefit will decrease the total 
monthly benefit payment under petitioner's pension and retirement 
plan in an amount that cannot be calculated to an exact amount at 
this time. The Court reserves for future determination the issue 
of the amount of survivor benefits to be awarded to the respondent 
and the issue of which party shall pay the monthly cost. Such 
determination shall be made at the time of petitioner's 
retirement, subject to the provision of the following paragraph. 
42. In order to avoid forfeiture of the ability to 
elect a full survivor benefit, the petitioner shall not elect a 
reduced survivor benefit prior to the Court's determination 
pursuant to the provision in paragraph 41 above. 
Life Insurance 
43 . The respondent should be listed as a one-half-
interest beneficiary on the currently existing life insurance 
policy on petitioner's life. The court finds that such 
designation is equitable considering the length of the marriage of 
the parties. 
Attorney's Fees 
44. The Court finds three reasons for awarding attorney 
fees in this case. First, the respondent did not ask for the 
divorce and did not want the divorce so she had to hire an 
attorney. Secondly, the Court finds the respondent does not have 
the ability to pay. Thirdly, in light of the rulings previously, 
the respondent prevailed in more issues than the petitioner. 
45. The petitioner shall pay $1,500 toward respondent's 
attorney's fees by December 2, 2002, based upon petitioner's 
ability to pay a portion of the fees. The respondent should be 
ordered to assume and pay the remainder of her own costs and 
attorney's fees incurred herein. The petitioner should be ordered 
to assume and pay his own costs and attorney's fees incurred 
herein. 
Miscellaneous Provisions 
46. Each party should be ordered to execute and deliver 
to the other party any documents required to implement or support 
the provisions of the Decree of Divorce entered by the Court. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The parties are subject to the jurisdiction of this 
Court as set forth above in the Court's Findings of Fact. 
2 . The petitioner should be granted a Decree of Divorce 
from the respondent on the grounds of irreconcilable differences 
effective October 2, 2002. 
Children of the Parties 
3 . The petitioner shall not be obligated to pay child 
support to the respondent in regards to Andrew and BreAnna. 
Health Insurance 
4. Each party should maintain their own health, accident, 
hospitalization and dental insurance. The petitioner should 
provide any necessary cooperation in respondent's obtaining for 
her benefit continued health, accident, hospitalization and dental 
insurance coverage under the federal C.O.B.R.A. legislation, at 
the sole cost of the respondent. 
5. On February 14, 2002, the Commissioner ordered the 
petitioner to pay the respondent $1,100 per month commencing March 
1, 2002. The Commissioner allowed the petitioner to deduct from 
said payments the amount of $87.50 per month representing the 
respondent's share of monthly health insurance premiums paid by 
petitioner. He also ordered (in a separate paragraph) each party 
to be responsible for their own debts from the date of separation. 
6. The respondent shall be entitled to receive the 
insurance check in the amount of $1,636.03 in satisfaction of the 
$1,312.50 owing pursuant to paragraph 6 above. The Court finds 
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that the check has already been delivered to the respondent as 
satisfaction of said obligation. 
Debts and Obligations 
7. The respondent should be required to pay and hold 
petitioner harmless on the debts owing on the Providian Card, the 
Citibank card, the Chase/Walmart Card, and the MBNA card. 
8. The petitioner should be required to pay and hold the 
respondent harmless on the debts owing on the America First Credit 
Union Visa card, the line of credit at America First Credit Union, 
and the Firestone account. 
9. Since the separation of the parties, the petitioner 
has paid approximately $61,000 toward the marital debt obligations 
that existed at the time of separation. The petitioner shall not 
receive any credit or offset in the marital settlement for such 
payments. 
Real Property 
10. The Bountiful Residence should be awarded to the 
petitioner subject to the debt thereon. The respondent should 
cooperate in executing a quitclaim deed in favor of the petitioner 
or other documents necessary to relinquish her interest in the 
Bountiful Residence. 
11. The petitioner should be permitted to sell the 
Bountiful Residence, with the respondent having no further claim 
or interest therein. The petitioner should be permitted to retain 
any profit or be responsible for any loss associated with any sale 
thereof. Respondent shall cooperate in executing any documents 
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and taking any steps necessary to allow the petitioner to proceed 
with the sale and transfer of the Residence. 
12. The respondent should not be responsible for 
payment of the first and second mortgage on the Bountiful 
Residence for the period she resided in the Residence from the 
date of separation through the time she moved to Oklahoma in 
August 2001. 
13. The parties have acquired additional interests in 
certain other real property, including but not limited to 
(a) Parcel 1 of land and associated improvements located at 10692 
Forbestown Road, Yuba County, California; (b) Parcel 13 of land 
and associated improvements located at 10747 Forbestown Road, Yuba 
County, California; (c) Parcel 15 of land and associated 
improvements located at 10695 Forbestown Road, Yuba County, 
California; (d) Parcel 16 of land and associated improvements 
located at 10691 Forbestown Road, Yuba County, California; 
(e) Parcels 8 and 10 of land located in Yuba County, California, 
also known as the Beehive Mine; and (f) Parcel 2 of land located 
in Yuba County, California, also known as Parcels 22 & 23. 
14. The above-mentioned California properties should be 
sold as soon as possible. 
15. The petitioner shall hereinafter be entitled to 
retain the rental income from Parcels 1 and 15 and shall be 
obligated to maintain the monthly payments on the mortgages for 
said parcels through the date of sale of said properties. 
16. The petitioner is awarded a right of first refusal 
for the purchase of any and all of the California properties. 
Upon acceptance of any bona fide offer to purchase a California 
property, the petitioner shall receive written notice of the 
acceptance of the offer and shall have thirty (3 0) days from the 
receipt of said notice to provide written notice of his election 
to purchase the property on the same terms as the bona fide offer. 
If petitioner exercises the right of first refusal, he shall pay 
the respondent the amount she would receive from the sale of that 
parcel, said payment to be made within 3 0 days of the time he 
exercises his right of first refusal. 
17. The respondent is awarded a secondary right of 
first refusal. In the event that the petitioner fails to exercise 
his right of first refusal within thirty (30) days following his 
receipt of notice of acceptance of a bona fide offer, the 
respondent shall thereafter have thirty (30) days to provide 
written notice of her election to purchase the property on the 
same terms as the bona fide offer. If respondent exercises her 
right of first refusal, she shall pay the petitioner the amount he 
would receive from the sale of that parcel, said payment to be 
made within 3 0 days of the time she exercises her right of first 
refusal. 
18. At the time of closing on the sale of each 
California property, proceeds from the sale shall first be applied 
to pay any and all closing costs, real estate commissions or fees, 
and any existing mortgage obligations owing, including any tax 
and/or debt delinquencies owed in relation to the property. After 
such costs have been paid, the petitioner shall be entitled to 
receive one-half of the total amount of payments he has made 
toward delinquent and current taxes on the property and, as 
applicable, one-half of the total amount he has paid toward the 
mortgage obligations in the property commencing with the month of 
October 2002 through the date of sale. Any and all remaining 
proceeds from the sale of the property shall be split equally 
between the parties. 
19. The real property and improvements located at 
(a) 1441 Michigan Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah, and (b) Blanding, 
Utah, are the separate, inherited property of the petitioner. 
Personal Property 
20. The respondent should be awarded those personal 
heirlooms located at the California properties, namely plates, 
platters, clocks, and lamps. The court finds that the ski pole in 
the possession of the petitioner is a family heirloom of the 
respondent and respondent shall be awarded the ski pole. 
Petitioner shall be permitted to make a model of the ski pole and 
shall deliver possession of the ski pole to the respondent within 
90 days of entry of this Order at her place of residence and at 
the expense of the petitioner. 
21. The remainder of the personal property should be 
awarded to the parties as currently divided. 
22. The $15,000 previously paid to the respondent shall 
be considered an offset for the additional value of personal 
property received by the petitioner. 
Alimony 
23 . The petitioner has made monthly payments to the 
respondent from the date of separation, including the total amount 
of $8,337 in monthly payments during the period from February 14, 
2002 through the month of October 2002. These payments shall be 
considered temporary alimony. 
24. Commencing with the month of November 2002, the 
petitioner should hereinafter be obligated to pay alimony to the 
respondent in the monthly amount of $1,000, payable one-half on 
the 5 th of the month and one-half on the 20 th of each month, to 
continue until alimony is reviewed at the time of petitioner's 
retirement. Alimony shall terminate as determined by the Court or 
upon the marriage or cohabitation of the respondent, the death of 
either party, or upon the occurrence of any event, which, under 
Utah law, shall cause alimony to cease. 
25. The alimony award shall be reviewed at the time of 
petitioner's retirement. Based upon the current circumstances of 
the parties, petitioner's retirement shall be considered to be a 
sufficient basis to permit a review of alimony. At the time of 
review, the Court shall make determinations as to whether the 
monthly alimony payments will be modified or discontinued. Such 
review shall be made in conjunction with review of the issues 
related to payment of the retirement and survivor benefits set 
forth in the following section. 
Pensions and Retirement Benefits 
26. The petitioner has acquired pension and retirement 
funds prior to and during the term of the marriage of the parties. 
The respondent should be entitled to receive one-half (1/2) of the 
petitioner's pension and retirement funds which were accrued 
during the term of the marriage pursuant to the Woodward formula 
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and a Qualified Domestic Relations Order shall issue in 
association therewith. 
27. The petitioner's retirement plan includes an option 
to elect either full or partial survivor benefits. The Court 
finds that election of a survivor benefit will decrease the total 
monthly benefit payment under petitioner's pension and retirement 
plan in an amount that cannot be calculated to an exact amount at 
this time. The Court reserves for future determination the issue 
of the amount of survivor benefits to be awarded to the respondent 
and the issue of which party shall pay the monthly cost. Such 
determination shall be made at the time of petitioner's 
retirement, subject to the provision of the following paragraph. 
28. In order to avoid forfeiture of the ability to 
elect a full survivor benefit, the petitioner shall not elect a 
reduced survivor benefit prior to the Court's determination 
pursuant to the provision in paragraph 27, above. 
Life Insurance 
29. The respondent should be listed as a one-half-
interest beneficiary on the currently existing life insurance 
policy on petitioner's life. The court finds that such 
designation is equitable considering the length of the marriage of 
the parties. 
Attorney's Fees 
30. The petitioner shall pay $1,500 toward respondent's 
attorney's fees by December 2, 2002. The respondent should be 
ordered to assume and pay the remainder of her own costs and 
attorney's fees incurred herein. The petitioner should be ordered 
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to assume and pay his own costs and attorney's fees incurred 
herein. 
Miscellaneous Provisions 
31. Each party should be ordered to execute and deliver 
to the other party any documents required to implement or support 
the provisions of the Decree of Divorce entered by the Court. 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WESLEY O. BAYLES, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
LINDA CARYL BAYLES, 
Respondent. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 004702059 DA 
Judge Thomas L. Kay 
The above-entitled matter was heard before the Honorable 
Thomas L. Kay, Judge of the above-entitled court, pursuant to a 
trial held on October 1 and October 2, 2002. The Court, having 
reviewed the documents and pleadings on file herein, having heard 
argument and testimony, and being fully advised as to both the 
evidence and law pertaining thereto, and having previously entered 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now, therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, as follows: 
1. The parties are subject to the jurisdiction of this 
Court as set forth above in the Court's Findings of Fact. 
2 . The petitioner should be granted a Decree of Divorce 
from the respondent on the grounds of irreconcilable differences 
effective October 2, 2002. 
IMJUWAVK-
 A 
Children of the Parties 
3. The petitioner is not obligated to pay child support 
to the respondent in regards to Andrew Vincent Salazar and BreAnna 
Rosa Flores Salazar. 
Health Insurance 
4. Each party shall maintain their own health, accident, 
hospitalization and dental insurance. The petitioner shall 
provide any necessary cooperation in respondent's obtaining for 
her benefit continued health, accident, hospitalization and dental 
insurance coverage under the federal C.O.B.R.A. legislation, at 
the sole cost of the respondent. 
5. The respondent shall be entitled to receive the 
insurance check in the amount of $1,636.03 in satisfaction of the 
$1,312.50 owing pursuant to the Commissioner's earlier 
recommendation. The check has already been delivered to the 
respondent as satisfaction of said obligation. 
Debts and Obligations 
6. The respondent is required to pay and hold petitioner 
harmless on the debts owing on the Providian Card, the Citibank 
card, the Chase/Walmart Card, and the MBNA card. 
7 . The petitioner is required to pay and hold the 
respondent harmless on the debts owing on the America First Credit 
Union Visa card, the line of credit at America First Credit Union, 
and the Firestone account. 
8. Since the separation of the parties, the petitioner 
has paid approximately $61,000 toward the marital debt obligations 
that existed at the time of separation. The petitioner shall not 
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receive any credit or offset in the marital settlement for such 
payments. 
Real Property 
9. The Bountiful Residence is awarded to the petitioner 
subject to the debt thereon. The respondent shall execute a 
quitclaim deed in favor of the petitioner or other documents 
necessary to relinquish her interest in the Bountiful Residence. 
10. The petitioner is permitted to sell the Bountiful 
Residence, with the respondent having no further claim or interest 
therein. The petitioner shall be permitted to retain any profit 
or be responsible for any loss associated with any sale thereof. 
Respondent shall cooperate in executing any documents and taking 
any steps necessary to allow the petitioner to proceed with the 
sale and transfer of the Residence. 
11. The respondent is not responsible for payment of 
the first and second mortgage on the Bountiful Residence for the 
period she resided in the Residence from the date of separation 
through the time she moved to Oklahoma in August 2001. 
12. The parties jointly hold certain other real 
property, namely (a) Parcel 1 of land and associated improvements 
located at 10692 Forbestown Road, Yuba County, California; (b) 
Parcel 13 of land and associated improvements located at 10747 
Forbestown Road, Yuba County, California; (c) Parcel 15 of land 
and associated improvements located at 10695 Forbestown Road, Yuba 
County, California; (d) Parcel 16 of land and associated 
improvements located at 10691 Forbestown Road, Yuba County, 
California; (e) Parcels 8 and 10 of land located in Yuba County, 
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California, also known as the Beehive Mine; and (f) Parcel 2 of 
land located in Yuba County, California, also known as Parcels 22 
& 23. 
13. The above-mentioned California properties shall be 
sold as soon as possible. 
14. The petitioner is hereinafter entitled to retain 
the rental income from Parcels 1 and 15 and is obligated to 
maintain the monthly payments on the mortgages for said parcels 
through the date of sale of said properties. 
15. The petitioner is awarded a right of first refusal 
for the purchase of any and all of the California properties. 
Upon acceptance of any bona fide offer to purchase a California 
property, the petitioner shall receive written notice of the 
acceptance of the offer and shall have thirty (3 0) days from the 
receipt of said notice to provide written notice of his election 
to purchase the property on the same terms as the bona fide offer. 
If petitioner exercises the right of first refusal, he shall pay 
the respondent the amount she would receive from the sale of that 
parcel, said payment to be made within 3 0 days of the time he 
exercises his right of first refusal. 
16. The respondent is awarded a secondary right of 
first refusal. In the event that the petitioner fails to exercise 
his right of first refusal within thirty (30) days following his 
receipt of notice of acceptance of a bona fide offer, the 
respondent shall thereafter have thirty (30) days to provide 
written notice of her election to purchase the property on the 
same terms as the bona fide offer. If respondent exercises her 
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right of first refusal, she shall pay the petitioner the amount he 
would receive from the sale of that parcel, said payment to be 
made within 3 0 days of the time she exercises her, right of first 
refusal. 
17. At the time of closing on the sale of each 
California property, proceeds from the sale shall first be applied 
to pay any and all closing costs, real estate commissions or fees, 
and any existing mortgage obligations owing, including any tax 
and/or debt delinquencies owed in relation to the property. After 
such costs have been paid, the petitioner shall be entitled to 
receive one-half of the total amount of payments he has made 
toward delinquent and current taxes on the property and, as 
applicable, one-half of the total amount he has paid toward the 
mortgage obligations in the property commencing with the month of 
October 2002 through the date of sale. Any and all remaining 
proceeds from the sale of the property shall be split equally 
between the parties. 
18. The real property and improvements located at 
(a) 1441 Michigan Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah, and (b) Blanding, 
Utah, are the separate, inherited property of the petitioner. 
Personal Property 
19. The respondent is awarded those personal heirlooms 
located at the California properties, namely plates, platters, 
clocks, and lamps. The ski pole in the possession of the 
petitioner is a family heirloom of the respondent and respondent 
is awarded the ski pole. Petitioner is permitted to make a model 
of the ski pole and shall deliver possession of the ski pole to 
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the respondent within 90 days of entry of this Decree at her place 
of residence and at the expense of the petitioner. 
20. The remainder of the personal property is awarded 
to the parties as currently divided. 
21. The $15,000 previously paid to the respondent shall 
be considered an offset for the additional value of personal 
property received by the petitioner. 
Alimony 
22. The petitioner has made monthly payments to the 
respondent from the date of separation, including the total amount 
of $8,337 in monthly payments during the period from February 14, 
2002 through the month of October 2002. These payments shall be 
considered temporary alimony. 
23. Commencing with the month of November 2002, the 
petitioner is hereinafter obligated to pay alimony to the 
respondent in the monthly amount of $1,000, payable one-half on 
the 5th of the month and one-half on the 20th of each month, to 
continue until alimony is reviewed at the time of petitioner's 
retirement. Alimony shall terminate as determined by the Court or 
upon the marriage or cohabitation of the respondent, the death of 
either party, or upon the occurrence of any event, which, under 
Utah law, shall cause alimony to cease. 
24. The alimony award shall be reviewed at the time of 
petitioner's retirement. Based upon the current circumstances of 
the parties, petitioner's retirement shall be considered to be a 
sufficient basis to permit a review of alimony. At the time of 
review, the Court shall make determinations as to whether the 
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monthly alimony payments will be modified or discontinued. Such 
review shall be made in conjunction with review of the issues 
related to payment of the retirement and survivor' benefits set 
forth in the following section. 
Pensions and Retirement Benefits 
25. The petitioner has acquired pension and retirement 
funds prior to and during the term of the marriage of the parties. 
The respondent is entitled to receive one-half (1/2) of the 
petitioner's pension and retirement funds which were accrued 
during the term of the marriage pursuant to the Woodward formula 
and a Qualified Domestic Relations Order shall issue in 
association therewith. 
26. The petitioner's retirement plan includes an option 
to elect either full or partial survivor benefits. The Court 
finds that election of a survivor benefit will decrease the total 
monthly benefit payment under petitioner's pension and retirement 
plan in an amount that cannot be calculated to an exact amount at 
this time. The Court reserves for future determination the issue 
of the amount of survivor benefits to be awarded to the respondent 
and the issue of which party shall pay the monthly cost. Such 
determination shall be made at the time of petitioner's 
retirement, subject to the provision of the following paragraph. 
27. In order to avoid forfeiture of the ability to 
elect a full survivor benefit, the petitioner shall not elect a 
reduced survivor benefit prior to the Court's determination 
pursuant to the provision in paragraph 26, above. 
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Life Insurance 
28. The respondent shall be listed as a one-half-
interest beneficiary on the currently existing life insurance 
policy on petitioner's life. 
Attorney's Fees 
29. The petitioner shall pay $1,500 toward respondent's 
attorney's fees by December 2, 2002. The respondent is ordered to 
assume and pay the remainder of her own costs and attorney's fees 
incurred herein. The petitioner is ordered to assume and pay his 
own costs and attorney's fees incurred herein. 
Miscellaneous Provisions 
30. Each party is ordered to execute and deliver to the 
other party any documents required to implement or support the 
provisions of this Decree. 
MADE AND ENTERED this ^ ^ d a v of November, 2002. 
BY THE COURT: 
:Vj 
HONORABLE T^MAS L. JO*^  y: !*<(-£r 
District Court Judge Y:-V " " 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
AWN^BARKING 
ney yfor Respondent 
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Michael D. Murphy (#5115) 
Attorney for Petitioner 
13 North Main 
P.O. Box 15 
Kaysville, Utah 84037 
(801) 547-9274 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WESLEY O. BAYLES, ) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Petitioner ) 
vs. ) 
LINDA CARYL BAYLES, ) Civil No. 004702059 
Respondent. ) Judge Thomas L. Kay 
This matter came on regularly scheduled before this Court 
for trial on July 3, 2 006, the Honorable Thomas L. Kay, District 
Court Judge, presiding. Petitioner was present and represented 
by his attorney, Michael D. Murphy, and the Respondent was 
present and represented by her attorney, Judy Dawn Barking. The 
Court, after hearing argument and testimony and having reviewed 
the parties' exhibits,and being fully advised in the premises, 
now makes and enters on July 5, 2006 the following Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The court finds that the issues in this case is whether 
or not Petitioner should continue to pay alimony to the 
Respondent and what, if any, money that Petitioner has paid 
Respondent since June of 2 004 should be paid back. 
2. The Court finds that the second issue the Court is 
considering is who should pay for the survivor benefits and if 
Respondent should reimburse the Petitioner for the survivor 
benefits that he paid since the filing of the Petition to Modify 
on June, 2 0 04. 
3. The third issue is the parcels of property and whether 
or not the Respondent should strictly comply with the terms and 
conditions which accompanied the various post divorce sales of 
the various parcels of property. 
4. The fourth issue is what should be done with the 
remaining unsold five-acre parcel. 
5. The fifth issue is who should be ordered to pay attorney 
fees in this matter. 
6. The sixth issue is who should be responsible for 
transportation costs and costs of trial. 
7. The remaining issue of whether or not Petitioner should 
continue to maintain the Respondent as a beneficiary on his life 
insurance policy has been stipulated and the parties stipulate 
that Petitioner should no longer be obligated to carry Respondent 
as a beneficiary on his life insurance policy. 
8. In regards to alimony, the Court finds that Petitioner 
was, at the time of October 2002, employed full time at the 
Internal Revenue Service. Petitioner had not had his disability 
rating from IRS prior to the trial and was earning almost twice* 
per month at the time of the entry of the Decree of 
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Divorce than he is earning now. The Court further finds that 
Petitioner filed the Petition to Modify in June of 2004 and that 
he was current in his monthly alimony through May of 2005. The 
Court further finds that from May of 2005, Respondent has been 
able to hold her own. 
9. The Court finds that Petitioner no longer has the 
ability to pay alimony. Petitioner is disabled and alimony 
should terminate. The Court finds that the parties' incomes are 
substantially similar and there is no way that alimony can be 
justified. Even if the Respondent needs alimony, Petitioner 
cannot pay alimony. 
10. The Court finds that $12,000 of alimony has been paid 
from the time of the motion to modify in June of 2004 through May 
of 2005. The Court finds that what alimony has been paid has been 
paid. The Court further finds that it is not appropriate under 
the circumstances of this case to order that the alimony that was 
paid has to be repaid. Both parties shall go forward with no 
on-going alimony, or with no alimony to be refunded or no 
alimony due. 
11. In regard to the survivor benefits, the Court finds 
that the cost of the survivor benefits is approximately $272.00 
per month and the issue is who should pay for those survivor 
benefits. Respondent already pays a proportion of the cost of 
the Survivor Benefit by virtue of a proportional reduction of her 
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Woodward share of the retirement benefit. Respondent will benefit 
by those survivor benefits. She currently receives $599.00 per 
month and that amount will be increased annually pursuant to cost 
of living increases. If Petitioner dies prior to the Respondent, 
Respondent's survivor benefits would triple. The Court sees 
arguments of the parties both ways in determining who should be 
obligated to pay for the survivor benefits and finds an argument 
can be made for splitting it down the middle. The Court finds 
that the survivor benefit has been chosen and has to continue and 
that Petitioner should be ordered to pay for it just as it has 
been in the past. Respondent will have no obligation to pay any 
back survivor benefit payments. Respondent currently receives 
$599.00 per month as her Woodward share of the retirement and 
that amount will be increased annually pursuant to annual cost of 
living increases. 
12. As an off-set of the survivor benefits being paid as 
they currently are, Petitioner shall receive the five acre parcel 
of property, free and clear of any claim by the Respondent, 
subject to any debt thereon. Petitioner will have full authority 
to sell the five acre parcel and receive all monies from that 
sale. The Court finds that if Petitioner lives 20 more years, the 
cost of the five acre parcel gets roughly close to what it would 
cost him to pay for the survivor benefit. The Court finds that 
is fair. The Court further finds that everybody agrees that 
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there may be a title problem on this five acres and that 
Petitioner may get less than what he's going to have to pay over 
the time, but finds that's the best the Court can do. It is 
equitable to give Respondent survivor benefit, but appropriate to 
give Petitioner a source of funds with which to pay the survivor 
benefit. 
13. In regards as to whether Respondent should comply with 
all terms of the sales for the various parcels of properties 
since the entry of the Decree of Divorce, the court finds that 
the position of Petitioner is that Respondent accepted offers 
that included terms of a grant deed, title insurance, and other 
items, and that these were bona fide offers. 
The Court finds that things like title insurance and things 
like these other issues, normally in a closing on a sale, all 
these things are deducted, including real estate commissions or 
whatever they are, as closing costs. The Court further finds 
that's what would have happened if the closing of these sales 
contracts would have been sent to a third party. 
The Court finds that if Petitioner wished to have Respondent 
comply with the terms of the sales contracts, then Petitioner 
should have done them prior to the time he sent payment. 
The Court finds Petitioner can argue that Respondent should 
have been put on notice of the terms of the contracts because 
they were in the contracts. 
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The Court finds that Respondent had not complied with the 
terms of the sales contracts, but that Petitioner did not demand 
compliance with the terms of the sales contracts until after 
payment had been made. 
The Court further finds the terms of the sales contracts 
were more of a technicality than what the bargain was. 
Thus the Court is not going to order that Respondent is 
going to have to comply with any of the terms of the sales 
contracts. Consequently, Respondent shall not be held in 
contempt for not complying any of the terms contained in the 
sales contracts of the various parcels of real property. 
Respondent was not put on notice to perform all the terms of 
the contracts before the checks for payment were sent; therefore, 
the Court will not order additional performance other than 
requiring Respondent to provide Petitioner with a grant deed on 
property held by the parties by a grant deed and with a quit 
claim deed on properties held by the parties on a quit claim 
deed. 
As co-owner of the property by quit claim deed, Petitioner 
cannot complain of not getting a warranty deed from Respondent. 
Petitioner should not get better title than he had before; he 
takes the property like it was when he had it prior to adding 
Respondent to the title. Respondent's only obligation is to 
provide Petitioner with the deed. 
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14. Each party shall pay for their own attorney fees. 
15. The court further finds that each party shall pay for 
their own costs and expenses. Petitioner's attorney shall 
reimburse the Respondent, as agreed, $120.00. This $120.00 is 
the cost that Respondent incurred for Petitioner's attorney 
making a motion for continuing the June 2 006 trial based upon the 
death of Petitioner's attorney's aunt. 
16. The Court finds that in regards to Petitioner obtaining 
title to the various properties, Respondent shall convey to 
Petitioner titles to the various properties as follows: If the 
parties acquired title to a parcel of property by a grant deed, 
then Petitioner shall receive a grant deed from Respondent. If 
the parties acquired title to a parcel of property by a quit 
claim deed, then Petitioner shall receive a quit claim deed from 
Respondent. Respondent shall have three months from the date of 
this ruling, July 5, 2006, to convey title to Petitioner for the 
unconveyed titles of property. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court concludes that the parties are subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Court as set out above under the Court's 
Findings of Fact, that the Petitioner is entitled to an Order 
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Modifying Decree of Divorce, the same to become final upon entry 
herein. 
2. The Court concludes that all other issues of dispute 
have been resolved with the Court pursuant to the above Findings 
of Fact. 
SIGNED and DATED this day of , 2007. 
BY THE COURT 
JUDGE 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, postage 
prepaid, this day of , 2007, to: 
Judy Dawn Barking 
Attorney for Respondent 
427 27th Street 
Ogden, UT 844 01 
Secretary 
Michael D. Murphy (#5115) 
Attorney for Petitioner 
13 North Main 
P.O. Box 15 
Kaysville, Utah 84037 
(801) 547-9274 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WESLEY O. BAYLES, ) ORDER MODIFYING 
) DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Petitioner ) 
vs. ) 
LINDA CARYL BAYLES, ) Civil No. 004702059 
Respondent. ) Judge Thomas L. Kay 
This matter came on regularly scheduled before this Court 
for trial on July 3, 2006, the Honorable Thomas L. Kay, District 
Court Judge, presiding. Petitioner was present and represented 
by his attorney, Michael D. Murphy, and the Respondent was 
present and represented by her attorney, Judy Dawn Barking. The 
Court, after hearing argument and testimony and having reviewed 
the parties' exhibits,and being fully advised in the premises, 
and having previously entered on July 5, 2006 its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, now makes and enters the following 
Order. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,. AND DECREED: 
1. Pursuant to the parties' stipulation, the Petitioner 
shall no longer be obligated to carry Respondent as a beneficiary 
on his life insurance policy. 
2. Pursuant to the Court's findings that Petitioner no 
longer has the ability to pay alimony, petitioner is disabled, 
and the parties' incomes are substantially similar and there is 
no way alimony can be justified. Even if the Respondent needs 
alimony, Petitioner cannot pay alimony, and the Court orders that 
alimony shall terminate. 
3. The $12,000 in alimony payments made since 2004 shall 
not be refunded. What alimony has been paid has been paid and 
the alimony that was paid shall not be repaid. Both parties 
shall go forward with no on-going alimony, or with no alimony to 
be refunded or with no alimony due. 
4. The survivor retirement benefits shall continue to be 
paid as they have been and Petitioner shall continue to pay for 
it just as it has been in the past. Respondent shall have no 
obligation to pay any back survivor benefit payments. 
5. As an off-set of the survivor benefits being paid as they 
currently are, Petitioner shall receive the five acre parcel of 
property, free and clear of any claim by the Respondent, subject 
to any debt thereon. Petitioner shall have full authority to 
sell the five acre parcel and receive all monies from that sale. 
6. Respondent shall not have to comply with any of the 
terms of the sales contracts other than Respondent shall provide 
Petitioner with a grant deed on property held by the parties by a 
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grant deed and with a quit claim deed on properties held by the 
parties on a quit claim deed. Respondent shall not be held in 
contempt for not complying with all the terms contained in the 
sale of the various parcels of real property. 
7. Each party shall pay for their own attorney fees. 
8. Each party shall pay for their own costs and expenses. 
Petitioner's attorney shall reimburse the Respondent, as agreed, 
$120.00. This $120.00 is the cost that Respondent incurred for 
Petitioner's attorney making a motion for continuing the June 
2006 trial based upon the death of Petitioner's attorney's aunt. 
9. Respondent shall convey to the Petitioner titles to the 
various properties as follows: If the parties acquired title to 
a parcel of property by a grant deed, then Petitioner shall 
receive a grant deed from Respondent. If the parties acquired 
title to a parcel of property by a quit claim deed, then 
Petitioner shall receive a quit claim deed from Respondent. 
Respondent shall have three months from the date of this ruling, 
July 5, 2006, to convey title to Petitioner for the unconveyed 
titled of property. 
SIGNED and DATED this day of , 2007. 
BY THE COURT 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Order Modifying Decree, postage prepaid, this 
day of , 2007, to: 
Judy Dawn Barking 
Attorney for Respondent 
427 27th Street 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Secretary 
